![]() "The entity assessed the update details and determined it was appropriate to deploy immediately. Then again, if you don't patch, the cyberattack will continue. Do you install firmware updates in the middle of production? What if that causes a disruption or there is a technical glitch? This led to a significant judgment call on the part of the power grid entity. Along with identifying the cause of the reboots, the firewall manufacturer offered a firmware update that would address the vulnerability." After receiving this notification, the entity initiated their event reporting procedure as dictated by their cybersecurity incident response plan. "Subsequent analysis determined that the reboots were initiated by an external entity exploiting a known firewall vulnerability. What did the logs reveal? Apparently, a failure to patch. "After an initial internal investigation, the entity decided that, in order to fully characterize the nature of the reboots and the potential causes, the firewall manufacturer should review logs." The power generator also reached out to its security vendor for help: This helped reveal what caused the attack and eventually stopped it. NERC's publication details a rapid investigation and (thankfully) an incident response plan that was quickly put into action. Power grid cyberattack: the cause and blocking the attack ![]() Each reboot severed communications for no more than five minutes between a controller and a generation site, however, this kept happening and the power grid cyberattack continued for nearly 10 hours.Operators determined the problem: for some reason, internet-facing firewalls were rebooting and going offline.Operators at a power control center started losing communication with "multiple remote power generation sites" for minutes at a time. ![]() The power grid attack happened during March 2019, in the western United States.power grid cyberattack detailed in new reportĪn organization called the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) revealed details of the new type of attack in a four-page "Lesson Learned" document. It appears to be a first-of-its-kind cyberattack that reveals the risks of our increasingly connected infrastructure. on World Wide Web Companion, pagesĬollective dynamics of `small-world' networks.Firewalls crashing, communications lost, and the realization that this was not a technology failure of the U.S. Plots Fruchterman–Reingold graph drawing Degree distribution Cumulative degree distribution Lorenz curve Spectral distribution of the adjacency matrix Spectral distribution of the normalized adjacency matrix Spectral distribution of the Laplacian Spectral graph drawing based on the adjacency matrix Spectral graph drawing based on the Laplacian Spectral graph drawing based on the normalized adjacency matrix Degree assortativity Zipf plot Hop distribution Double Laplacian graph drawing Delaunay graph drawing Clustering coefficient distribution Average neighbor degree distribution SynGraphy Matrix decompositions plots Downloads Spectral bipartite frustration b K = 0.001 509 75 Tail power law exponent with p γ 3 = 7.631 00ĭegree assortativity p-value p ρ = 0.691 396 ![]() ![]() Relative edge distribution entropy H er = 0.978 307 ![]()
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